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We extend simple search-theoretic models of crime, unemployment and inequality to
incorporate on-the-job search. This is valuable because, although the simple models can
be used to illustrate some important points concerning the economics of crime, on-the-job
search models are more relevant empirically as well as more interesting in terms of the
types of equilibria they generate. We characterize crime decisions, unemployment, and
the equilibrium wage distribution. We use quantitative methods to illustrate key results,
including a multiplicity of equilibria with di⁄erent unemployment and crime rates, and to
discuss the e⁄ects of changes in labor market and anti-crime policies.
￿We thank our colleagues as well as seminar and conference participants at various places for their input. We
thank the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at NYU as well as the NSF for ￿nancial support. The usual
disclaimer applies.1. Introduction
In Burdett, Lagos and Wright (forthcoming) ￿hereafter BLW ￿we developed a search-theoretic
general equilibrium model that can be used to study the interrelations between crime, inequality,
and unemployment.1 The search framework is a natural one for these issues because it not
only endogenously generates wage inequality and unemployment, it also allows us to introduce
criminal activity in a simple and natural way. The resulting model provides a very tractable
extension of the standard textbook job search framework (see e.g. Mortensen 1986) that can
be used to investigate the e⁄ects of anti-crime policies, like changes in the severity or length of
jail sentences, the apprehension rate, or in programs that reduce victimization, as well as more
standard labor market policy variables, like unemployment insurance or taxes. A feature we like
about the framework for these purposes is that the three key variables ￿crime, inequality, and
unemployment ￿are all endogenous.
It is useful to have general equilibrium models to study these issues and provide guidance
for empirical research, especially given that much work on the economics of crime uses partial
equilibrium reasoning or empirical methods with very little grounding in economic theory. The
analysis in BLW also yields some surprising results from the perspective of labor economics. For
example, once crime is introduced into an otherwise standard environment, where we previously
had uniqueness the model can now generate multiple equilibria with di⁄erent levels of crime,
inequality, and unemployment. Also, where we previously had a single wage the model can now
generate wage dispersion across homogeneous workers in equilibrium. Despite these arguments
in support of a search-theoretic approach, we have to admit that the model in BLW is too
1It seems clear that the economics of crime is worth studying, and so we do not attempt to motivate the
problem other than by referencing a sample of papers, including Becker (1968), Sah (1991), Beno￿t and Osborne
(1995), Freeman (1996), Tabarrok (1997), Grogger (1998), Fender (1999), and • Imrohoro… glu, Merlo and Rupert
(1999, 2000). A recent paper similar to ours is Huang, Laing and Wang (2002); they also adopt a search-theoretic
approach, but the focus of their study as well as the details of their model are quite di⁄erent.
2simple on an important dimension: to keep things tractable, the analysis in that paper ruled out
on-the-job search.
In this paper we remedy this by generalizing the model to include on-the-job search. Ruling
it out allowed us to make some points about the interactions between crime, inequality, and
unemployment, about multiple equilibria, and so on, in a relatively simple setting, and for those
purposes simplicity was a virtue. However, we think it is important to generalize the model for
several reasons. For one thing, on-the-job search is not only an intuitively reasonable feature to
have in a model, it is a necessary feature if one wants to account for the large number of job-to-
job transitions in the data (see Burdett, Imai and Wright 2003 for a discussion). Moreover, the
on-the-job search model is now the standard benchmark in theoretical and structural empirical
labor economics (see Mortensen and Pissarides 1999 for a survey). This model, at least without
crime, is well understood theoretically, generates many nice qualitative results, and has been
successfully implemented using formal econometric methods. It seems obviously useful to study
crime in the context of this standard benchmark framework.
Future empirical work on the economics of crime may well bene￿t from working with struc-
tural models like the one presented here, but ￿rst it is necessary to sort out its theoretical
properties. This is what we do. The exercise is nontrivial because adding crime to a model
changes things a lot. For example, consider wage dispersion. It is well known that the on-
the-job search model generates equilibrium wage dispersion even without crime.2 We ￿nd that
introducing crime changes qualitatively the nature of the wage distribution. Further, the stan-
dard on-the-job search model has a unique equilibrium, but once crime is introduced there can
be multiple equilibria with di⁄erent levels of unemployment, inequality and crime. Such mul-
tiplicity is interesting in light of the empirical work that ￿nds it is di¢ cult to account for the
2Burdett and Mortensen (1998) were the ￿rst to emphasize this; di⁄erent but related models of equilibrium
wage dispersion include Albrecht and Axel (1984) and Albrecht and Vroman (2000).
3high variance of crime rates across locations (see e.g. Glaeser et al. 1996). In BLW we gave
examples of multiplicity, but here we show how it arises in the context of the more reasonable
and empirically relevant model with on-the-job search. Moreover, we emphasize that even when
there is a unique equilibrium the results are interesting in terms of the relationships between
crime, inequality and unemployment, and in terms of the way our model di⁄ers from standard
on-the-job search model.
Although one of the main goals is to characterize the theoretical properties of the model, we
also report numerical results ￿something that would not have been so interesting in the simple
cases analyzed in BLW. We calibrate the key labor market parameters to consensus estimates
in literature, and in particular to those in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and the key crime
parameters to those used in • Imrohoro… glu, Merlo and Rupert (2000, 2001). We use the calibrated
model to illustrate several points. First we quantify the e⁄ects of changes in labor market and
anti-crime policies. As an example, in the baseline calibration unemployment compensation
involves a replacement rate of around 0:53, which generates unemployment and crime rates of
10% and 2:7%; if we raise the replacement rate to 0:65 the unemployment and crime rates
change to around 14% and 5:2%. We also show that multiple equilibria may arise for reasonable
parameters, and that these equilibria can di⁄er dramatically; in one example, the unemployment
rate can vary from 6% to 23%, the crime rate from 0 to 10%, and the fraction of people in jail
from 0 to nearly 1=2, depending on which equilibrium we happen to select.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the problem of a worker
taking as given the distribution of wages. Equilibrium is discussed in Section 3, where we present
the ￿rms￿problem and determine the equilibrium wage distribution. In Section 4 we present
the calibrated version of the model, and among other things, show how multiple equilibria can
arise and quantify the e⁄ects of policy changes. We conclude in Section 5.
42. Workers
In this section we present the basic environment, and discuss worker behavior in detail. There is
a [0;1] continuum of in￿nite-lived and risk-neutral workers, and a [0;N] continuum of in￿nite-
lived and risk-neutral ￿rms. Thus N is the ￿rm-worker ratio. All workers are ex ante identical,
as are all ￿rms. For now, all that we need to say about ￿rms is that to each one there is
associated a wage w, the ￿rm pays w to all of its employees, and it hires any worker that it
contacts who is willing to accept w. Let F(w) denote the distribution of wage o⁄ers from which
workers will be sampling. Later F(w) will be endogenized, but for now it is taken as given. In
any case, the distribution of wages paid to employed workers, G(w), will not generally be the
same as the distribution of wages o⁄ered and needs to be determined.
At any point in time a worker can be in one of three distinct states: employed (at some
wage w), unemployed, or in jail. Let the numbers of workers in each state be e, u, and n. Let
the payo⁄, or value, functions in these states be V1(w), V0, and J. While unemployed, workers
get a ￿ ow payment b and receive job o⁄ers at rate ￿0, each of which is a random draw from
F(w). While employed, workers get their wage w, receive new o⁄ers from F independently of
their current wage at rate ￿1, and, in addition to perhaps leaving jobs for endogenous reasons
(they might quit or get sent to jail, say), also have their jobs destroyed for exogenous reasons
at rate ￿. Agents in jail get a ￿ ow payment z, are released into the unemployment pool at rate
￿, and receive no job o⁄ers until released. We assume for simplicity that the release rate ￿ does
not depend on time served, and that ex convicts face the same market opportunities as other
unemployed workers.
We introduce criminal activity as follows. First, unemployed workers encounter opportunities
to commit crime at rate ￿0 while employed workers encounter such opportunities at rate ￿1.
5A crime opportunity is a chance to steal some amount g that is ￿xed for now but could also
be endogenized (see below). Let ￿0 and ￿1(w) be the probabilities with which unemployed and
employed workers commit crimes, respectively. Given you have just committed a crime, let ￿
be the probability of being sent to jail. For convenience, we assume that you are either caught
instantly or not at all ￿there are no long investigations resulting in eventual prosecution and
conviction. We also assume the probability is 0 that two or more events, such as a job o⁄er
and a crime opportunity, occur simultaneously, as would be the case if, e.g., these events occur
according to independent Poisson processes.
Given g is the instantaneous gain from committing a crime, the net payo⁄s from crime for
unemployed and for employed workers are
K0 = g + ￿J + (1 ￿ ￿)V0 (2.1)
K1(w) = g + ￿J + (1 ￿ ￿)V1(w); (2.2)
since they get caught with probability ￿, and we assume they get to keep g in any case (this
assumption is not important for any results). An unemployed worker commits a crime i⁄K0 > V0
and a worker employed at w commits a crime i⁄ K1(w) > V1(w), assuming for convenience that
￿tie-breaking rules￿go the right way when agents are indi⁄erent. Therefore the crime decisions





1 if V0 ￿ J <
g
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1 if V1(w) ￿ J <
g
￿




Whether employed or not, workers fall victim to crime at rate ￿. The victimization rate ￿
can be endogenized by setting the total number of victims equal to the total number of crimes,
which in equilibrium implies
(e + u)￿ = u￿0￿0 + e￿1
Z
￿1(w)dG(w): (2.4)
6We will impose this as an equilibrium condition in the quantitative analysis below, but for now
we analyze things taking ￿ as given. One can rationalize this by saying that the group of agents
under consideration engage in crime in other neighborhoods but not their own, so that whether
or not they do has no e⁄ect on their neighborhood crime rate. In any case, for now we take ￿
as given, but this will be relaxed below.
When victimized, an unemployed worker su⁄ers loss ‘0 = ‘ + ￿b while an employed victims
su⁄ers loss ‘1(w) = ‘ + ￿w. They su⁄er these losses whether or not the perpetrator is caught.
We do not necessarily impose any particular relation between theses losses and the gain to crime









is average income in the non-institutionalized population. In the quantitative analysis we will
specialize things to the case of lump sum loss, by setting ￿ = 0, and impose that the gain is
exactly equal to the loss, g = ‘. We do this mainly as a way to reduce the number of parameters in
that analysis, but for the qualitative results in this section we use the more general speci￿cation.
The ￿ ow Bellman equation for an unemployed worker is
rV0 = b ￿ ￿(‘ + ￿b) + ￿0￿0(K0 ￿ V0) + ￿0Ex maxfV1 (x) ￿ V0;0g; (2.6)
where r is the rate of time preference. In words, the per-period return to being unemployed rV0
equals instantaneous income b, minus the expected loss from being victimized, ￿(‘ + ￿b), plus
the expected value of receiving a crime opportunity, plus the expected value of receiving a job
o⁄er. Similarly, for an agent employed at wage w the Bellman equation is
rV1 (w) = w ￿ ￿(‘ + ￿w) + ￿ [V0 ￿ V1 (w)] + ￿1￿1(w)[K1 (w) ￿ V1 (w)]
+￿1Ex maxfV1 (x) ￿ V1 (w);0g; (2.7)
7where the ￿nal term represents the expected value of receiving a new o⁄er x while employed at
w. Finally, for an agent in jail
rJ = z + ￿(V0 ￿ J); (2.8)
since he can do nothing but ￿enjoy￿z and wait to be released into the unemployment pool.
There are two aspects to an individual￿ s strategy: the decision to accept a job and the
decision to commit a crime. In terms of the former, since V1(w) is increasing in w it is clear
that an employed worker should accept any outside o⁄er above his current wage w, and an
unemployed worker should accept any o⁄er above the reservation wage R de￿ned by V1 (R) =
V0. In terms of the crime decision, observe that K1 (w) ￿ V1 (w) is decreasing in w, and that
K0 ￿ V0 = K1 (R) ￿ V1 (R). The former observation implies workers are less likely to engage in
crime when their wages are higher, and the latter implies the unemployed will engage in crime i⁄
workers employed at the reservation wage do. Hence the situation is as follows. One possibility
is V0 ￿ J ￿ g=￿, which implies ￿0 = 0 and therefore ￿1(w) = 0 for all w ￿ R. In this case
there is no crime. The other possibility is V0 ￿ J < g=￿, which implies ￿0 = 1 and therefore
￿1(w) = 1 for w < C and ￿1(w) = 0 for w ￿ C, where C > R is the crime wage de￿ned by
K1(C) = V1(C). In this case all the unemployed commit crime and the employed commit crime
i⁄ they earn less than C. By (2.2), at the crime wage w = C the expected gain just equals the
expected cost of crime:
g = ￿[V1 (C) ￿ J]: (2.9)
We now derive the reservation wage equation, which is a natural extension of standard results
in the search literature, and a new relation called the crime wage equation. Begin by evaluating
(2.7) at w = R, using the facts that V1(R) = V0 and K1 (R) = K0, to get
rV1 (R) = R ￿ ￿(￿R + ‘) + ￿1￿1(R)[K0 ￿ V0] + ￿1￿(R): (2.10)
8Here ￿(R) is the value of the function
￿(w) = Ex maxfV1 (x) ￿ V1(w);0g =
Z 1
w
[V1 (x) ￿ V1 (w)]dF(x) (2.11)





1 (x)[1 ￿ F(x)]dx; (2.12)
and then insert V 0




(1 ￿ ￿￿)[1 ￿ F(x)]dx




(1 ￿ ￿￿)[1 ￿ F(x)]dx
r + ￿ + ￿1 [1 ￿ F(x)]
: (2.13)
In fact, to highlight the dependence of ￿ on the crime wage C in what follows, we write ￿(w;C).
If we now equate (2.10) and (2.6) and rearrange we get
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(R ￿ b) = (￿0 ￿ ￿1)￿0(K0 ￿ V0) + (￿0 ￿ ￿1)￿(R;C): (2.14)
To simplify this further, notice that K0 ￿ V0 = g ￿ ￿(V0 ￿ J) by virtue of (2.1), and that by
subtracting (2.6) and (2.8) we get V0 ￿ J = ￿(R;C) where
￿(R;C) =
(1 ￿ ￿￿)b ￿ z ￿ ￿‘ + ￿0￿0g + ￿0￿(R;C)
r + ￿ + ￿0￿0￿
: (2.15)
Hence, we have
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(R ￿ b) = (￿0 ￿ ￿1)￿0￿(R;C) + (￿0 ￿ ￿1)￿(R;C); (2.16)
which is our generalization of the standard reservation wage equation in the literature. To get
the crime wage equation, we begin by evaluating (2.7) at w = C,
rV1(C) = C(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿‘ + ￿[V0 ￿ V1(C)] + ￿1￿(C;C): (2.17)
Inserting V1(C) = J + g=￿ from (2.9) and eliminating J using (2.8), we get the crime wage
equation
(1 ￿ ￿￿)C = z + ￿‘ + (r + ￿)
g
￿
+ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿(R;C) ￿ ￿1￿(C;C): (2.18)
9Given F(w), (2.16) and (2.18) determine the reservation and crime wages. Note, however,
that the decision variable ￿0 shows up in these equations. There are two possible cases. First,
if V0 ￿ J ￿ g=￿ then ￿0 = 0 and ￿1(w) = 0 for all w ￿ R. In this case there is no crime. One
can interpret this case as R > C, in the sense that at any job that workers ￿nd acceptable they
prefer not to do crime. In fact, we do not really need to solve for C in this case, and we can
reduce the model to




r + ￿ + ￿1 [1 ￿ F(x)]
(2.19)
by inserting (2.13) evaluated at w = R > C into (2.16). This is exactly the reservation wage
equation from the standard model. Second, if V0 ￿ J ￿ g=￿ then ￿0 = 1 and at least the
unemployed commit crime, while the employed commit crime i⁄ employed at w < C where
C > R. In this case we need to solve (2.16) and (2.18) jointly for (R;C).
Below we will endogenize the distribution F, but one can also study the model for an ex-
ogenous F. For example, one can simply assume idiosyncratic randomness in productivity p
across matches, and adopt some bargaining solution ￿the easiest case is to give workers all the
bargaining power, so that w = p, as then F is simply the exogenous productivity distribution.
In any case, given F the model generates predictions about the e⁄ects of many variables on R
and C. This is especially easy when ￿0 = ￿1 and ￿0 = ￿1 since then (2.16) immediately implies
R = b, so we can focus on the e⁄ects on C. In this case, one can easily show @C=@￿ > 0,
@C=@z > 0, and @C=@￿ < 0, e.g., so that workers are less likely to commit crime if we make
sentences longer or less pleasant, or if we increase the apprehension probability. Similarly, one
can show @C=@￿ > 0, so that workers are less likely to commit crime if we reduce the rate at
which they are victimized. Also, one can show @C=@b is proportional to ￿ ￿ ￿, so workers are
less likely to commit crime when we increase unemployment insurance i⁄ ￿ < ￿. See BLW for
more discussion of these policy implications.
10Figure 2.1: Labor market ￿ ows
We also want to know the distribution of workers across states. Let eL be the number of
workers employed at w < C, eH = e ￿ eL the number employed at w ￿ C, and ￿ = 1 ￿ F(C)
the fraction of ￿rms o⁄ering at least C. For the case ￿0 = 1 the labor market ￿ ows are shown
in Figure 2.1 under the assumption w ￿ R with probability 1.3 It is straightforward to solve for
the steady state (eL;eH;u;n) in terms of ￿,
eH = (￿ + ￿1 + ￿1￿)￿￿￿0=￿
eL = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿￿0=￿
u = (￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1￿)￿￿=￿
n = ￿0 (￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1￿)￿￿=￿
(2.20)
where ￿ = (￿ + ￿￿1)(￿￿ + ￿￿0 + ￿0￿￿) + ￿1￿ (￿￿￿ + ￿￿0 + ￿0￿￿). This describes the steady
3We make this assumption merely to reduce the clutter. If w < R with positive probability one can simply
reinterpret ￿0 as ￿0[1 ￿ F(R)] and ￿ as the fraction of ￿rms o⁄ering w ￿ C conditional on w ￿ R. In any case,
we will have w ￿ R with probability 1 once we endogenize wages in the next section.
11state when ￿0 = 1. In the case ￿0 = 0, there is no crime, and the steady state is u = ￿=(￿+￿0),
e = eH = ￿0=(￿+￿0), and eL = n = 0, as in the standard model. From (2.20) one can derive the
unemployment rate U = u=(1￿n) and crime rate C = (u￿0￿0+eL￿1￿1)=(1￿n) (notice that we
use only the non-institutionalized population in the denominators). One can show policies that
reduce C, such as a change in z, ￿, ￿, ￿ or b, reduce the number in jail, the number unemployed,
the unemployment rate, and the crime rate.
We can also use steady-state considerations to relate the distribution of wages paid to the
distribution of wages o⁄ered. In the case ￿0 = 1, it is convenient to introduce
FH (w) = F(wjw ￿ C) and FL (w) = F(wjw < C) (2.21)
GH (w) = G(wjw ￿ C) and GL (w) = G(wjw < C); (2.22)
the conditional distributions above and below the crime wage. Then one can derive4
GL (w) =
￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)FL (w)u
f￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ FL (w)]geL
(2.23)
GH (w) =
￿FH (w)(￿0u + ￿1eL)
f￿ + ￿1￿ [1 ￿ FH (w)]geH
: (2.24)
Eliminating u, eL and eH using (2.20), we have
GL (w) =
FL (w)




1 + kH [1 ￿ FH (w)]
; (2.26)
4To verify these results, assume w ￿ R with probability 1 (again, this must be true when wages are endoge-
nous). Then, given any w < C, the number of workers employed at a wage no greater than w is GL (w)eL. The
distribution GL evolves through time according to
d
dt
GL (w)eL = ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)FL (w)u ￿ f￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ FL (w)]geLGL (w):
Similarly, GH evolves according to
d
dt
GH (w)eH = (￿0u + ￿1eL)￿FH (w) ￿ f￿ + ￿1￿ [1 ￿ FH (w)]geH:GH (w):
Setting the time derivatives to 0 and simplifying yields (2.23) and (2.24).
12where kL =
￿1(1￿￿)
￿+￿1￿+￿1￿ and kH = ￿1￿
￿ .
Let wH and wH be the lower and upper bounds of the support of FH, and wL and wL the
bounds of the support of FL. Then, in general, the unconditional distribution is:
G(w) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if w < wL
eL
eL+eH GL (w) if wL ￿ w < wL
eL
eL+eH if wL ￿ w < wH
eL
eL+eH + eH
eL+eH GH (w) if wH ￿ w < wH
1 if wH ￿ w:
(2.27)
Using (2.20), we have:
G(w) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0 if w < wL
(1￿￿)￿
￿+(￿1￿+￿1)￿GL (w) if wL ￿ w < wL
(1￿￿)￿




￿+(￿1￿+￿1)￿GH (w) if wH ￿ w < wH
1 if wH ￿ w:
(2.28)
This can be simpli￿ed further by inserting (2.25) and (2.26), but we leave this as an exercise.
The results when ￿0 = 0 can be found by setting ￿ = 1,
G(w) =
F (w)
1 + k[1 ￿ F (w)]
; (2.29)
where k = ￿1
￿ , which is the usual result in the model with no crime.
To derive the densities, consider the case ￿0 = 1. Then we di⁄erentiate (2.25) and (2.26),
and the unconditional density is G0(w) = eL
eL+eH G0
L(w) if w < C and G0(w) = eH
eL+eH G0
H(w) if
w > C. Using (2.20), this reduces to
G0(w) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿ kLF0(w)
f￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1[1 ￿ F(w)]g
2 if w < C
￿ kHF0(w)
f￿ + ￿1[1 ￿ F(w)]g
2 if w > C
(2.30)
where ￿ kL =
￿(￿+￿1￿+￿1)(￿+￿1￿+￿1￿)
￿+￿1￿￿+￿1￿ and ￿ kH =
￿(￿+￿1￿+￿1)(￿+￿1￿)
￿+￿1￿￿+￿1￿ . Consider a policy such as a
change in z, ￿, ￿, ￿ or b that causes C to fall from C1 to C0. As these parameters a⁄ect the
density only through ￿ = 1￿F(C), it is relatively easy to see that G0(w) shifts down for w < C0
13and w > C1 while it shifts up for w 2 (C0;C1). Hence, there are fewer workers in the tails of
the distribution and more in the middle. Therefore certain policies that lower C not only reduce
crime and unemployment, they also reduce wage inequality.
3. Equilibrium
In this section we make the wage o⁄er distribution F endogenous. Basically, the model will be
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) with crime. It is assumed that each ￿rm has linear technology
with common and constant marginal product p > b, and that it posts a wage at which it commits
to hire all workers it contacts. Each ￿rm takes as given the wages posted by other ￿rms, as
described by F, as well as worker behavior, as described by (R;C). For simplicity we assume
￿rms maximize steady state pro￿t, which can be understood as the limiting case of maximizing
the present value of the pro￿t ￿ ow when r ￿ 0; see Coles (2001). Hence, from now on we assume
r ￿ 0. An equilibrium is simply a distribution of wages F(w) such that every wage posted with
positive probability earns the same pro￿t, and no other wage could earn greater pro￿t.
BLW analyze the model in the case of no on-the-job search, ￿1 = 0. We summarize brie￿ y
those results as follows. First, there can never be more than two wages posted: in equilibrium,
all ￿rms either post w = R or w = C. This is a generalization of the Diamond (1971) result
that all ￿rms post w = R; here, at least some ￿rms may want to post C rather than R in
order to dissuade their workers from criminal activity in order to reduce turnover. Obviously,
paying C reduces turnover because criminals sometimes get caught and sent to jail. The types
of possible equilibria are as follows. There can exist a Type N (for no crime) equilibrium with
￿0 = 0. There can also exist equilibria where ￿0 = 1 so that at least the unemployed commit
crime and either: all ￿rms post w = C so no employed workers commit crime, called Type L
(for low crime) equilibria; all ￿rms post w = R so all employed workers commit crime, called
14Type H (for high crime) equilibria; or a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) post C and the remaining 1 ￿ ￿ post
R, so that some employed workers commit crime and others do not, called Type M (for medium
crime) equilibria.
We can get wage dispersion (0 < ￿ < 1) in the model simply because in equilibrium the
low wage ￿rms get more pro￿t per worker, but the high wage ￿rms have more workers due to
their lower turnover. To be more precise, there is a threshold ￿ b such that for b > ￿ b we get
￿0 = 0, and hence no crime, while for b < ￿ b we get ￿0 = 1 and at least the unemployed commit
crime. In this case, given b, for low p there is a unique Type H equilibrium, for high p there is
a unique Type L equilibrium, and for intermediate p the results depend on parameters: there is
a critical ￿￿ de￿ned in terms of the other parameters such that if ￿ > ￿￿ then there is a unique
Type M equilibrium and if ￿ < ￿￿ there exist three equilibria, one each of Type L, Type H and
Type M. Hence the model not only generates wage dispersion, it generates multiple equilibria ￿
and these are both impossible in the model without crime. Moreover, when multiple equilibria
exist one can show that higher crime rates come with higher unemployment rates, although not
necessarily more inequality.
We want to extend these results to the case with on-the-job search. One reason is the fact
that wage-posting equilibrium are much more interesting with on-the-job search than without.
In particular, even without crime the Burdett-Mortensen (1998) model has a continuous wage
distribution. The intuitive reason is that posting a higher w a⁄ects the rate at which you recruit
workers from and lose workers to competing ￿rms. Again, high-wage ￿rms earn lower pro￿t per
worker but end up with more workers in the model. Despite this complication, we show below
that when we introduce crime into the model some of the basic results from BLW will continue
to hold, and the same types of equilibria potentially exist. That is, we may have a Type N
equilibrium with ￿0 = 0, and when ￿0 = 1 we can potentially have either a Type L equilibrium
15with ￿ = 0, a Type H equilibrium with ￿ = 1, or a Type M equilibrium with ￿ 2 (0;1).
To begin the analysis, we start with the case ￿0 = 0, where there is no crime and things look
much like the standard model. Let L(w) be the steady state number of workers employed at a
￿rm paying w, so that steady state pro￿t is ￿(w) = (p ￿ w)L(w). Firms choose w taking as
given worker behavior and the wages of other ￿rms. In equilibrium any wage w on the support
of F must yield ￿(w) = ￿￿ and any wage o⁄ the support must yield ￿(w) ￿ ￿￿. We now
provide some properties that hold for any equilibrium F, in the case ￿0 = 0, including some
properties of the lower and upper bounds of its support, denoted w and w. We omit proofs of
these results since they are very similar to the case ￿0 = 1 presented in Lemma 2 below, and
also because when ￿0 = 0 the results are the same as those in the standard model.
Lemma 1. Suppose ￿0 = 0. Then we know the following: (a) F has no mass points; (b)
w = R; (c) w < p; and (d) there are no gaps between w and w.
We now derive F explicitly. Since all wages on the support of F earn equal pro￿ts, including
w = w = R, we have
(p ￿ w)L(w) = (p ￿ R)L(R) for all w 2 [R;w]: (3.1)
Also, since the number of workers at a ￿rm paying w must equal the number of workers earning
w divided by the number of ￿rms paying w, we have L(w) = eG0 (w)=F0 (w) where e is the
number of employed workers.5 Inserting (2.29), we can reduce this to
L(w) =
(￿ + ￿1)￿0u
f￿ + ￿1 [1 ￿ F (w)]g
2: (3.2)
Substituting L(w) as well as the steady state u into (3.1) and using F(R) = 0, we get
(p ￿ w)




2 for all w 2 [R;w]; (3.3)
5This assumes F and G are di⁄erentiable, which as we will see turns out to be true.










for all w 2 [R;w]: (3.4)
This is the unique equilibrium wage distribution consistent with equal pro￿t for all w in the
support of F, given that we are in an equilibrium with ￿0 = 0. By solving F (w) = 1 we ￿nd the





. The lower bound w = R is found by solving the
reservation wage equation, which can be integrated explicitly once we know that F(w). Thus,
(3.4) implies that (2.19) reduces to
R ￿ b =
(￿0 ￿ ￿1)￿1(p ￿ R)
(￿ + ￿1)2 (3.5)





2 + ￿1 (￿0 ￿ ￿1)
b +
￿1 (￿0 ￿ ￿1)
(￿ + ￿1)
2 + ￿1 (￿0 ￿ ￿1)
p; (3.6)
which gives R is a weighted average of b and p.
This fully describes the outcome, given ￿0 = 0. We now must verify that ￿0 = 0 is a best




￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)b ￿ z ￿ ￿‘ + ￿0￿0g + ￿0
Z 1
C
(1 ￿ ￿￿)[1 ￿ F(x)]dx
￿ + ￿1 [1 ￿ F(x)]
: (3.7)
After inserting F and again explicitly performing the integration, (3.7) becomes p ￿ ^ p0(b), where
^ p0(b) =
(￿ + ￿1)












This fully describes the set of parameters where the Type N equilibrium exists. The only dif-
ference from the basic on-the-job search model is that we have to check that ￿0 = 0 is a best
response ￿i.e. we have to check that p ￿ ^ p0(b) ￿but as long as this condition is satis￿ed, the
equilibrium in terms of R, F(w), and everything else is standard.
17We now move to the case ￿0 = 1. Recall that wH and wH are the lower and upper bounds
of the support of FH, and wL and wL are the bounds of the support of FL. Then we have
the following analog to Lemma 1. Note that we state the results for a general ￿, with the
understanding that some cases are vacuous; e.g., if ￿ = 0 then any statements about wH and
wH do not apply since there are no ￿rms paying above C.
Lemma 2. Suppose ￿0 = 1. Then we know the following: (a) F has no mass points; (b)
wL = R and wH = C; (c) wL < C and wH < p; and (d) there are no gaps between wL and wL
or between wH and wH, although there is a gap between wL and wH.
Proof. To show (a), suppose there is a mass point at w0 < p. Then any ￿rm paying w0 could
earn strictly greater pro￿t by paying w0 + " for some " > 0 since this would imply a discrete
increase in the number of workers it employs. It implies a discrete increase because now the ￿rm
can hire workers currently earning w0, and it meets workers earning w0 with positive probability
given the mass point. Hence, there can be no mass point at w0 < p. There cannot be a mass
point at w ￿ p, since no ￿rm o⁄ers w ￿ p (because this would imply non-positive pro￿t, and
pro￿ts are positive for any w between R and p).
To show (b), ￿rst suppose w0 is the lowest wage in FL. Clearly w0 ￿ R since a ￿rm o⁄ering
less than R earns 0 pro￿t. But if w0 > R then the ￿rm earns more pro￿t by o⁄ering R since it
hires and loses workers at the same rate (agents still accept i⁄they are unemployed and leave for
any other ￿rm). This means wL = R. Now suppose w0 > C is the lowest wage in FH. Given w0
cannot be a mass point, the ￿rm paying w0 can strictly increase its pro￿t by paying C, because
in doing so it does not lose workers any faster. Hence, wH = C.
To show (c), suppose that w = C ￿i.e. there are ￿rms o⁄ering less than C but arbitrarily
close to C. But then they can earn greater pro￿t by o⁄ering C since they discretely reduce the
rate at which they lose workers to jail. Hence, wL < C. Now suppose wH ￿ p; as this implies
18non-positive pro￿t, we have wH < p.
Finally, to show (d), suppose there is an non-empty interval [w0;w00], with C = 2 [w0;w00], with
some ￿rm paying w00 and no ￿rm paying w 2 [w0;w00]. Then the ￿rm paying w00 can make
strictly greater pro￿t by paying w00 ￿ " for some " > 0. This is because such a ￿rm loses no
more workers than it did before and still hires at the same rate. ￿
We now proceed to derive the wage distribution. Let the number of workers employed by
￿rms paying w conditional on w being above or below C be denoted LH (w) or LL (w). The
same logic that led to (3.2) now leads to
LL (w) =
￿0 (￿ + ￿1 + ￿1￿)u
f￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ FL (w)]g
2 (3.9)
LH (w) =
(￿ + ￿1￿)(￿0u + ￿1eL)
f￿ + ￿1￿ [1 ￿ FH (w)]g
2: (3.10)
The equal pro￿t conditions for ￿rms within each distribution are
(p ￿ R)LL (R) = (p ￿ w)LL (w) for all w < C (3.11)
(p ￿ C)LH (C) = (p ￿ w)LH (w) for all w ￿ C: (3.12)
Substituting LL and LH and rearranging, we have the following versions of (3.4):
FL (w) =
￿ + ￿1 + ￿1￿


















The upper bounds are found by solving FL (wL) = FH (wH) = 1:
wL = p ￿ (p ￿ R)
￿
￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1￿
￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1
￿2
(3.15)






This generalizes the standard on-the-job search model in the sense that we now have the
equilibrium wage distributions above and below the crime wage consistent with equal pro￿ts
19by ￿rms. However, while the distribution in (3.4) was de￿ned in terms of only R, here the
distributions are de￿ned in terms of R, C and the fraction of high wage ￿rms ￿. So we still
have some work to do. In the standard model we could integrate the reservation wage equation
explicitly once one has the functional form of F, and then solve for R. A generalization is true
here, although things are slightly messier. In particular, we can substitute FL and FH into
(2.13) and explicitly integrate to get


































￿ (￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1￿)
(￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1)












￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1￿





Substituting (3.17) into (2.16) and (2.18) yields two linear equations in R and C, given a
value for ￿. It is easy to solve for R and C in terms of ￿, and we write the solution [R(￿);C (￿)]
in what follows. It remains to determine the equilibrium ￿, from which we can then solve for R
6For this derivation it is useful to keep in mind that the unconditional distribution function F in (2.13) is
obtained from the conditional distribution functions as follows:
F (w) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if w < R
(1 ￿ ￿)FL (w) if R ￿ w < wL
1 ￿ ￿ if wL ￿ w < C
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿FH (w) if C ￿ w < wH
1 if wH ￿ w:










￿+￿1￿+￿1[1￿F(w)]dw = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
￿C
2 C ￿ ￿R








￿+￿1[1￿F(w)] dw = (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿3 (p ￿ C):
20and C as well as the distribution F and all the other endogenous variables. To determine ￿ we
compare pro￿ts across ￿rms paying above and below C (recall that the conditional distributions
FL and FH were determined as a function of ￿ by comparing pro￿ts for di⁄erent wages below
C and di⁄erent wages above C). We are interested in the sign of ￿[C (￿)] ￿ ￿[R(￿)]. Using
(3.9)-(3.12) we see that this pro￿t di⁄erential has the same sign as
T (￿) =
(￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1)[p ￿ C (￿)]
(￿ + ￿￿1)(￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿￿1)
￿
p ￿ R(￿)
￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1
: (3.19)
At this point, we have collapsed the entire model into a single relationship in one variable,
￿. If T (0) < 0 then we have a candidate Type H equilibrium in which there are only low-
wage ￿rms and hence all workers commit crime. If T (1) > 0 then we have a candidate Type
L equilibrium where there are only high-wage ￿rms and no (employed) workers commit crime.
And if there exists a ￿￿ such that T (￿￿) = 0 then we have a candidate Type M equilibrium
where a fraction ￿￿ of the ￿rms pay high wages while the rest pay low wages, and workers
employed at the former do not commit crime while those employed at the latter do. These are
candidate equilibria because there is one more thing to check: the conjecture that ￿0 = 1, upon
which this construction was based. But this is equivalent to R(￿) < C (￿), since we know that
the unemployed commit crime i⁄ workers employed at the reservation wage commit crime.
We have now described all of the conditions for the various equilibria. One can derive
restrictions on parameters under which the di⁄erent types of equilibria with ￿0 = 1 exist, as
we did above for the Type N equilibrium.7 Instead, we will pursue a quantitative approach in
what follows. However, we emphasize that on many dimensions the general model is much richer
qualitatively, especially in terms of the equilibrium wage distribution, once we have on-the-job
7Basically, one looks and T(￿) and notices that Type H equilibrium exists i⁄ T (0) < 0 and Type L equilibrium
exists i⁄ T (1) > 0. Because T is not necessarily monotone, a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for the Type
M equilibrium is either T(0) > 0 and T(1) < 0, or T(1) > 0 and T(0) < 0. In particular, all three types of
equilibria must coexist if T(1) > 0 > T(0). So the main results on the existence of each type of equilibrium and
on multiplicity come from studying T at the points ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1, which is messy but not intractable.
21Figure 3.1: Densities in di⁄erent equilibria
search. We summarize the di⁄erent possible outcomes in Figure 3.1, given what we know from
Lemma 2 as well as the derived functional form for F. The lower left panel, for example, shows
a Type M equilibrium, with a conditional distribution FL having support [R; ￿ wL], a conditional
distribution FH having support [C; ￿ wH], and a gap between them. The other cases with ￿0 = 1
are really special cases, since Type L (Type H) equilibrium simply has no mass (all of its mass)
in the lower support. The upper left panel shows a Type N equilibrium, where all wages are
above C, including w = R, so that no one commits crime.
22We close this section by mentioning that the di⁄erence between the models with and without
on-the-job search can perhaps be understood intuitively from this ￿gure. Without on-the-job
search, BLW show that equilibrium may generate either two wages or a single wage, and if it
is a single wage it can be either the crime wage C or the reservation wage R. With on-the-job
search, we ￿nd here that equilibrium may generate either two conditional wage distributions
with lower bounds of C and R, or a single wage distribution with a lower bound of R or C. One
way to think of things is that the crime part of the model generates the implication that ￿rms
may want to pay low or high wages, while the on-the-job search part of the model generates the
distribution of wages above R or C. The interaction of crime and on-the-job search can generate
some fairly interesting wage distributions, as we will see numerically in what follows.
4. Numerical Results
In this section we use quantitative methods to show how some interesting outcomes are possible,
including multiple equilibria, for reasonable parameter values. We also study the e⁄ects of
changes in the policy variables. As described in the previous section, the method is as follows.
Given parameters values, we ￿rst look for a Type N equilibrium by checking the best response
condition for ￿0 = 0, which we reduced to p ￿ ^ p0(b). If this condition is satis￿ed, then R,
F(w) and the other endogenous variables are given by the standard formulae. Then we look for
equilibria with ￿0 = 1: a Type H equilibrium requires T(0) < 0, a Type L equilibrium requires
T(1) > 0, and a Type M equilibrium requires T(￿) = 0 where 0 < ￿ < 1, and in each case we
must have R(￿) < C (￿) to verify ￿0 = 1. Given ￿, we solve for [R(￿);C (￿)], F(w) and so on
using the formulae derived above.
We ￿rst report results for a benchmark economy where we know that there is no crime. To
be sure that no crime occurs, we assume agents have no opportunities for crime either on or o⁄
23the job: ￿0 = ￿1 = 0. The other parameters are then set as follows, and their values will stay
the same in the models with crime unless otherwise indicated. First we set r ￿ 0, in accordance
with the analytic results derived above; this lack of discounting is nonstandard in calibration,
but we think it probably does not matter much for our results. We then normalize p = 1, and
set b = 0:5 as a benchmark, which will imply that unemployment income is just over half the
average earned wage; we will also try various other values of b. For the labor-market arrival rates
we use consensus estimates from the on-the-job search literature. In particular, Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002) report ￿0 = :077, ￿1 = :012 and ￿ = :005, and say that these estimates are
￿roughly consistent￿with previous results. These are all the parameters we need in the no-crime
economy.
b U C ￿ eH eL u n Ew cv
.4 .0609 0 0 0 .9390 .0609 0 .9523 .0376
.5 .0609 0 0 0 .9390 .0609 0 .9602 .0311
.6 .0609 0 0 0 .9390 .0609 0 .9682 .0247
Table 4.1: Equilibrium in the no-crime economy.
Some statistics from the unique equilibrium of the no-crime economy are reported in Table
4.1, with our benchmark b = 0:5 as well as for two other levels of unemployment income, b = 0:4
and b = 0:6. The table gives the unemployment rate U, the crime rate C, the fraction of ￿rms ￿
o⁄ering a wage at least as high as the crime wage, and the steady state distribution of workers
across (eH;eL;u;n). Notice that ￿ = 0 in the table: this says that all employed workers would
commit crime if they had the opportunity, but since ￿0 = ￿1 = 0 they cannot, and therefore
C = 0 in equilibrium. We also report two statistics of the endogenous distribution of wages
earned G: the mean Ew, and the coe¢ cient of variation cv (the standard deviation divided by
the mean), which is a measure of wage inequality. Notice that, as in the standard on-the-job
24search model, changes in b do not a⁄ect U, simply because when all ￿rms post w at least as
big as R job creation is ￿xed by ￿0, and job destruction is ￿xed by ￿. Increases in b do induce
higher Ew and lower cv, however.
We now allow agents to encounter crime opportunities at rates ￿1 = ￿0 = 0:1. If the period
is one month, this means agents get on average just over 1 such opportunity per year; this will
turn out to generate fairly realistic crime rates below in at least some of the equilibria. As
a benchmark we equate the gain from crime to the loss and assume they are lump sum (i.e.
￿ = 0). We set g = ‘ = 2:5 so that the gain or loss is about 2:5 times the average monthly wage.
We also set as a benchmark z = 0:25, so that the imputed income while in jail is half of that
of an unemployed agent. Based on the evidence discussed in • Imrohoro… glu, Merlo and Rupert
(2000, 2001) we calibrate the other key crime parameters to ￿ = 1=12 and ￿ = 0:185. The ￿nal
thing to set is the victimization rate ￿; this we endogenize by imposing (2.4) as an equilibrium
condition. We will consider in turn three synthetic neighborhoods that will di⁄er in terms of
various parameters, including the severity of jail z, the average length of sentences 1=￿, the gain
(equals the loss) from crime g, the apprehension probability ￿, and unemployment income b.8
Our ￿rst case is Neighborhood 1, with parameters as in the previous paragraph. As seen in
the left panel of Figure 4.1, in this case there is a unique equilibrium and it is Type M (the other
panels show the other neighborhoods to be discussed below). Table 4.2 reports the outcome for
the base case of b = 0:5, and also for b = 0:4 and 0:6. When b = 0:5, 38% of ￿rms pay high
wages, the crime rate is about 2:7%, and the unemployment rate is about 10%. Notice that U
is considerably higher here than in the no-crime economy. Also, inequality as measured by cv
8Our calibration is complicated by the fact that di⁄erent neighborhoods may well have very di⁄erent para-
meters for, say, the probability of getting caught, which we are trying to capture with an average value of ￿.
Also, as is always the case with calibration, when we take parameters from di⁄erent sources there is a question of
consistency. One way to interpret things consistently is to say that we are asking what would happen if we took
a neighborhood of people like the ones in the samples used to estimate (￿;￿0;￿1) and gave them the assumed
values of the crime parameters (￿;g;z;￿;￿).
25Figure 4.1: The function T(￿) in di⁄erent neighborhoods
is more than double the no-crime economy. We think of Neighborhood 1 as roughly capturing
a realistic medium-crime neighborhood: 10% of the people are unemployed, and these plus the
16% in low-wage jobs would commit a crime, while the 69% in high-wage jobs would not. About
5:6% of the people are in jail. The Table shows how the economy responds to changes in b.
Perhaps surprisingly, a more generous unemployment bene￿t fosters crime: e.g., b = 0:6 implies
the crime rate jumps to over 5% and the unemployment rate to over 14%, while the number of
people in jail nearly doubles. Also, observe that the mean wage falls and inequality rises.
b U C ￿ eH eL u n Ew cv
.4 .0849 .0191 .52 .7760 .1018 .0815 .0407 .9494 .0630
.5 .0989 .0267 .38 .6922 .1586 .0933 .0559 .9448 .0666
.6 .1447 .0516 .15 .4346 .3328 .1298 .1027 .9188 .0766
Table 4.2: Equilibrium in Neigbhorhood 1.
Although such a public policy disaster need not occur when we increase b, depending on the
other parameters, Neighborhood 1 provides an example of what could go wrong when we try
to ￿ght crime with social assistance. One intuition for these results is that in this calibration
￿ = 0:005 is smaller than ￿ = 0:08, and this means that the expected duration of a job is longer
26than the average jail sentence. Consequently, an increase in b, although good for both those in
jail and those working, is proportionally more of a good thing for those in jail since they can
expect to take advantage of it sooner. This makes workers employed at a given w more inclined
to commit crime, and hence the equilibrium crime wage C goes up (recall from Section 2 that
@C=@b is proportional to ￿ ￿ ￿). This in turn makes it less pro￿table for ￿rms to pay enough
to keep their workers honest, so fewer do. Hence there is more crime, and so on. Note that
increasing b in Neighborhood 1 reduces Ew and increases cv, the opposite of what the no-crime
model predicts. Also, the unemployment rate increases with b in Neighborhood 1, while it did
not respond to b in the no-crime case9.
￿ U C ￿ eH eL u n Ew cv
1/9 .1499 .0544 .14 .4178 .3616 .1375 .0831 .8929 .1000
1/12 .0989 .0267 .38 .6922 .1586 .0933 .0559 .9448 .0666
1/15 .0707 .0114 .74 .8585 .0421 .0686 .0307 .9703 .0339
Table 4.3: E⁄ects on Neigbhorhood 1 of changes in ￿.
z U C ￿ eH eL u n Ew cv
.30 .1120 .0338 .29 .6156 .2104 .1042 .0698 .9320 .0780
.25 .0989 .0267 .38 .6922 .1586 .0933 .0559 .9448 .0666
.20 .0886 .0211 .47 .7537 .1169 .0846 .0447 .9545 .0562
Table 4.4: E⁄ects on Neigbhorhood 1 of changes in z.
￿ U C ￿ eH eL u n Ew cv
.17 .1232 .0423 .22 .5307 .2763 .1134 .0795 .9187 .0847
.185 .0989 .0267 .38 .6922 .1586 .0933 .0559 .9448 .0666
.20 .0840 .0178 .54 .7878 .0906 .0805 .0411 .9598 .0508
Table 4.5: E⁄ects on Neigbhorhood 1 of changes in ￿.
9Note that in on-the-job search models one can reinterpret b as a legislated minimum wage and the results
go through basically unchanged. Hence, one can recast our policy predictions in terms of minimum wages rather
than unemployment insurance.
27Tables 4.3 - 4.5 show the e⁄ects in Neighborhood 1 of three direct anti-crime policies: increas-
ing the expected duration of jail sentences by lowering ￿; making jail less pleasant by reducing
z; and increasing the apprehension probability ￿. All of these increase the fraction of high-wage
￿rms, since workers are less inclined to commit crimes at any given wage and so it becomes
cheaper in equilibrium to pay at least C. This in turn reduces the crime and unemployment
rates as well as the jail population. It was by no means a forgone conclusion that putting people
in jail with a high probability or letting them out with a lower probability would reduce the
number in jail ￿it just worked out that way for these parameters.10 It is also interesting that
smaller ￿ or z and higher ￿, in addition to discouraging crime, also increase average wages and
reduce inequality. If, for example, one had data on neighborhoods with di⁄erent values of these
variables but did not control adequately for this, one would see inequality is positively associated
with crime, but obviously this would not imply causation. The point is that there is a need for
caution in interpreting these data.
We now move to Neighborhood 2, where b = z = :56, g = ‘ = 2:95 and ￿ = 1=48, while all
other parameters are as in Neighborhood 1. Neighborhood 2 has a penal system that is severe
in terms of the length of the average jail sentence, but since z = b, jail is not so di⁄erent from
unemployment on a day-to-day basis (the present discounted values of income are di⁄erent since
people in jail do not get job o⁄ers). These parameters imply that if a Type N equilibrium exists
in Neighborhood 2 it will have the same unemployment rate as the case ￿0 = ￿1 = 0. The
middle panel of Figure 4.1 suggests, since T(0) < 0 < T(1), that Neighborhood 2 has three
equilibria, one with ￿ = 0, one with ￿ 2 (0;1), and one with ￿ = 1. The case ￿ = 0 is indeed
a Type H equilibrium where all agents engage in crime, since one can check the condition for
10We emphasize that there are important general equilibrium e⁄ects at work here. For example, increasing ￿
reduces the incentive to commit crime directly, but additionally this indices ￿rms to change their wage policies,
which reduces crime further.
28￿0 = 1 holds. The case ￿ 2 (0;1) is similarly a Type M equilibrium. The case ￿ = 1 only
looks like a Type L equilibrium, however, because given ￿ = 1 the condition for ￿0 = 1 fails.
Hence, there is no Type L equilibrium. In fact, there is a third equilibrium, but it is a Type N
equilibrium.11
Figure 4.2: Wage densities in Neighborhood 2
A point we want to emphasize is that it does not take extreme or unrealistic parameter values
to generate multiple equilibria here, and they are rather di⁄erent. Figure 4.2 shows the density
of wage o⁄ers F0 and the density of wages paid G0 in the di⁄erent equilibria. In every case
F0 starts out above G0 and end ups above it, which is a fundamental feature of any on-the-job
search model, of course, since lower wage ￿rms end up with fewer workers. The left panel in the
diagram depicts the Type M equilibrium where there are two branches to the distributions, one
on the interval [R;wL] and the other on the interval [C;wH]. The latter interval happens to be
11What happens is that if only the unemployed commit crimes, the endogenous crime rate ￿ is su¢ ciently low
that the unemployed in fact prefer not to commit crime; hence the Type L equilibrium does not exist. But ￿
is su¢ ciently big in the Type M and Type H equilibria that the unemployed do prefer to also commit crime.
The Type N equilibrium exists because when ￿ = 0 the unemployed de￿nitely prefer not to commit for this
parameterization. For this sort of result it is important that ￿ is endogenous, but even with ￿ ￿xed there is
another channel of multiplicity working through the wage setting process; see BLW for an extended discussion.
29small in this example ￿as reported in Table 4.6, only about ￿ = 7% of the ￿rms pay above the
crime wage, while eH=(eH + eL) = 17% of employed workers earn above the crime wage here
￿but this is a function of parameters, and ￿ will be much higher in the next case presented
below. The middle panel shows the Type H equilibrium where all wages are below C, and the
right panel shows the Type N equilibrium where all wages are above C.
Equilibrium U C ￿ eH eL u n Ew cv
Type H .2338 .1000 0 0 .4058 .1238 .4703 .8200 .0538
Type M .1824 .072 .068 .1702 .3282 .1112 .3903 .8742 .0906
Type N .0609 0 1 .9390 0 .0609 0 .9675 .0252
Table 4.6: Di⁄erent equilibria in Neighborhood 2.
More details are given in Table 4.6. It is remarkable how di⁄erent the outcomes are. As we go
from the Type N to Type H equilibrium, the unemployment rate goes from 6% to 23%, the crime
rate from 0 to 10%, and the fraction of people in jail from 0 to nearly 1=2. Across the di⁄erent
equilibria in Table 4.6, higher C is associated with lower Ew, but notice that the relationship
between C and the cv is nonmonotonic. Although not shown in the Table, in the Type M
equilibrium, increasing b lowers U and C. This is the opposite of the result in Neighborhood 1
￿which is no surprise since, as shown in Figure 4.1, in one case the T(￿) function crosses the
axis from above and in the other it crosses from below. Small changes in b have no e⁄ect on U
or C in the Type N or Type H equilibria because in these cases either all agents or none of them
engage in crime, although of course, for bigger changes in parameters a particular equilibrium
may cease to exist. We also found in all three equilibria that an increase in b raises the mean
wage and reduces inequality in Neighborhood 2, as in the no-crime economy.
Let us now move to Neighborhood 3, where b = 0:633, z = 0:59, g = 4:43, ￿ = 1=19,
￿ = 0:545 and ￿ = 0:0065 while the remaining parameters are as in Neighborhood 1. The
30distinctive feature of this case is that g is very large ￿crime really pays. However, it is also very
likely that you will get caught, ￿ = 0:55, and sentences are fairly long, 19 months. As suggested
by Figure 4.1, in this case there are two Type M equilibria and one Type H equilibrium, and in
each case the best response condition for ￿0 = 1 holds. Hence, there can be multiple equilibria
of the same type. Figure 4.3 shows F0 in the left panel and G0 in the right panel for the two
Type M equilibria. The allocations are summarized in Table 4.8. As in Neighborhood 2, high
C is associated with low Ew, but the relationship between C and inequality now is monotonic:
for this parameterization, high crime rates are associated with more inequality, although once
again we emphasize that both are endogenous. Finally, notice again just how much things can
di⁄er across equilibria: in this neighborhood U can be either 8% or 44%.
Figure 4.3: Densities in Type M equilibria in Neighborhood 3
Equilibrium U C ￿ eH eL u n Ew cv
Type H .4420 .1000 0 0 .2741 .2171 .5087 .7325 .0379
Type M-1 .1030 .0141 .66 .7487 .0336 .0898 .1278 .9757 .0368
Type M-2 .0836 .0092 .90 .8284 .0080 .0763 .0873 .9834 .0178
Table 4.7: Di⁄erent equilibria in Neigbhorhood 3.
315. Conclusion
We have analyzed analytically and quantitatively a model of crime, unemployment, and inequal-
ity, based on the standard on-the-job search model of the labor market extended to incorporate
crime ￿or, alternatively, based on the model in BLW extended to include on-the-job search.
The on-the-job search model is a natural framework within which to discuss many labor mar-
ket issues, and it seems to have interesting implications for the economics of crime, as well.
While the model in BLW had something to say about crime, the general framework becomes
much more interesting and much closer to standard empirical labor economics once we extend
it to incorporate on-the-job search. Hence, we think this version should be the benchmark for
quantitative analysis and policy discussions in future research.
We provided the key theorems and formulae needed to characterize the crime decisions,
wage distributions, and unemployment rate. We also provided numerical analyses to illustrate
how various interesting outcomes can arise, including multiple equilibria for not unreasonable
parameters. This may be interesting in light of the empirical ￿nding that it di¢ cult to account
for variance in crime across locations (Glaeser et al. 1996). However, even when there is a unique
equilibrium the model is quite useful. We used it to discuss the e⁄ects of changes in policy on
unemployment, crime and the wage distribution. We also discussed how the mean wage and wage
inequality change with parameters, and how they vary across equilibria for given parameters.
Some of our results, like the nonmonotone relationship between crime and inequality, may help
explain the weak correlations reported in empirical studies (see Freeman 1996). Future work
could perhaps use the model as a basis for more detailed econometric studies in this important
policy area.
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